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A careful and reflective reading of the excerpts of legal documents given
immediately below is necessary for understanding why we have chosen to
give such a title to this Article.
EXCERPTS
TWELVE TABLES: LAW II

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ART.
2315(A)

If you cause any unlawful
Every act whatever of man
damage . . .
accidentally
and that causes damage to another
unintentionally, you must make obliges him by whose fault it
good the loss, either by tendering happened to repair it. 2
what has caused it, or by payment. 1
GAIUS: SECOND
COMMENTARY

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
ARTICLES

(10) Things subject to human right Art. 448. Division of things
are either public or private. 3
Things are divided into
common, public, and private;
corporeals and incorporeals; and
movables and immovables. 4
(11) Things which are public are
considered to be the property of no
individual, for they are held to
belong to the people at large;
things which are private are the
property of individuals. 5

Art. 453. Private things
Private things are owned by
individuals, other private persons,
and by the state or its political
subdivisions in their capacity as
private persons. 6

Copyright 2022, by ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR.
∗ Professor Emeritus, Hermann Moyse, Sr. Professor of Law, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. 1 JUSTINIAN I, Table VII. Concerning Crimes, Law II, reprinted in THE
CIVIL LAW (R.P. Pryne ed., The Great Library Collection 2015).
2. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A) (2021).
3. G. INST. 2.10.
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2021).
5. G. INST. 2.11.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 453 (2021).
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(12) Moreover, some things are Art. 461. Corporeals and
corporeal
and
others
are incorporeals
7
incorporeal.
Corporeals are things that
have a body, whether animate or
inanimate, and can be felt or
touched.
Incorporeals are things that
have no body, but are
comprehended by understanding,
such as the rights of inheritance,
servitudes, obligations, and right
of intellectual property. 8
(13) Corporeal things are those that Art. 471. Corporeal movables
can be touched, as, for instance . . .
Corporeal movables are
clothing, gold . . . and innumerable things, whether animate or
other objects. 9
inanimate, that normally move or
can be moved from one place to
another. 10
(14) Incorporeal things are such as Art. 475. Things not immovable
are not tangible, and are those
All things, corporeal or
consisting merely of rights, as, for incorporeal, that the law does not
instance, inheritances. . . . 11
consider as immovables, are
movables. 12
What do these texts, presented side by side and from very different
centuries, have in common? Obviously, one could point out that their
subject matters are either “things” or “liability,” to use some very broad
vernacular or common terms. One could also point out that they are short,
concise in their statements, and worded in general terms. The common
feature herein singled out and made the general background of this Article
is the style in which these statements—whether from the XII Tables,
Gaius’ Commentary, or the Louisiana Civil Code—are couched. It is a
style loaded with legal implications that we attempt to identify and explain
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

G. INST. 2.12.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2021).
G. INST. 2.13.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 471 (2021).
G. INST. 2.14
LA. CIV. CODE art. 475 (2021).
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in Part I. In Part II, we will look, with some detail, into an important
implication that will be referred to as “legal characterization” or “legal
qualification.” We will attempt, as far as possible, to illustrate the
relevance of the implication of legal characterization: first, by making a
scrupulous analysis of one Civil Code article and some court decisions;
second, by explaining why we consider the Code article in question to be
either well written or poorly written and the court decisions either “good”
or “bad” examples of the use of legal characterization as a civilian method
of reasoning.
I: THE ROMANISTIC STYLE: FEATURES
The texts that open this Article are, indeed, from different time
periods. Law II was a part of Table VII Concerning Crimes of the Laws of
the XII Tables of 450 B.C.E. 13 It is interesting and, we dare say, surprising
to find so much resemblance between the legal statement of Law II and
article 2315(A) of the Louisiana Civil Code of 2021 C.E. 14 Likewise, the
provisions of the “Second Commentary” were the creation of the great
Roman jurist Gaius, who lived in the second century A.D. 15 Again, the
resemblance of these provisions from the second century A.D. with the
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code listed above is quite amazing. Can this
resemblance be explained? How can these provisions, as well as Law II of
Table VII, have survived through so many centuries without having truly
“aged”? How is it conceivable that centuries could have gone by without
eroding the substantive law of the old texts? Is it possible that there was
some “osmosis” between the “substantive law” (of things and liability) and
a certain style of writing down the law, a style that we find to be common
in the civil law systems that inherited the jus civile (jus and not lex) of
Roman law? This style cannot be labeled or identified as the “civil law
style” from jus civile because the jus civile was the system of law
applicable to the Roman citizens16 in contrast with the jus gentium
applicable to the foreigners. 17 This style can, however, be referred to and
called the “Romanistic style” because it finds its source and its original
features in the style of these texts dating back to the days of the great jurists
whose writings were incorporated in the Digest of Justinian.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

JUSTINIAN I, supra note 1.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315(A) (2021).
Around 130 to 180 A.D.
Civis meaning citizen.
Hence the two praetors, praetor urbanus and praetor peregrinus. See
PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 8–18 (Cambridge Univ. Press
1999); J.M. KELLY, ROMAN LITIGATION 85–101 (Oxford Univ. Press 1966).
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Some original features of the Romanistic style that are still found
today in the codifying technique of civil law jurisdictions can be gathered
under the following headings: (a) drafting style; (b) general statements;
(c) very few definitions; (d) simple and accessible language; (e)
institutions.
A. Drafting Style
For numerous reasons—including the limited availability of scholarly
resources; the rudimentary technical tools available to engrave, incise, and
impress; the scarcity of means of diffusion and access to knowledge; and
the division and separation of social classes—the visible and accessible
version of the law “for the few,” which was under the form of signs,
symbols, letters, and words, had to be made in as concise and simple a
form as possible so as to be comprehensible to the “many.” So for
example, under the broad and generic words “damage” 18 (Law II Table
VII) and “corporeal and incorporeal” 19 things (Gaius, Second
Commentary), it was possible to subsume that all sorts of “corporeal
things” known, and even unknown at the time of the drafting of the law,
would fall under the intentionally broad adjectives “corporeal” or
“incorporeal.” A listing of such things would be unwise and therefore,
unnecessary.
This Romanistic style is now the style of modern civil codes, such as
the Louisiana Civil Code. As we wrote elsewhere, “[O]ne cannot but be
struck by the bluntness, rigidity, abstractness and coldness of the style of
the code articles.” 20 This style is used purposefully in a code, the language
of which warrants its adaptability and pliability. As Portalis wrote: “The
law which has neither eyes nor ears, should be able to be modified where
equity requires it, following the circumstances and the inconveniences it
creates in particular cases.” 21 As heir of the Romanistic style of drafting
today,
[t]he legislative style must, by its clarity and brevity, express
18. JUSTINIAN I, supra note 1.
19. G. INST. 2.13, 2.14.
20. Alain Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code, 64 TUL. L. REV. 693,
697 (1970) [hereinafter Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code] (translating
9 PAR P. A. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES SUR LE
CODE CIVIL 33 (1827)).
21. Id. at 698 n.20. For more information on Portalis, see Alain A. Levasseur,
Code Napoleon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 773 (1969) [hereinafter
Levasseur, Code Napoleon].
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norms adapted to the goals, needs and implementation of the law,
by making them as accessible despite the requirements of the legal
technique. Thus, the legislative style and the quality of a code, like
any other normative text, presupposes a certain terminology and
phraseology. . . . A terminology must be, above all, precise and
exact. . . . The expression of the rules of law is generally direct
and impersonal. . . . 22
As a logical implication, this Romanistic and civil law style of drafting
casts the courts and jurists as the indispensable “interpreters” of the
legislator, making the law relevant and appropriate in particular instances.
Thereby, the courts, with the assistance of the jurists, become, in a sense,
the artisans of the will of the legislator by crafting the proper legal
characterization from the materials and the facts. 23
B. Definitions
The language of the civil code is meant to support its adaptability or
pliability so that the code, being “the fruit of the passage of time,” 24 will
cover “a multiplicity of particular issues and . . . make an art of reason
itself.” 25 This is one important reason why a civil code contains very few
definitions. Remembering the well-known warning of the Digest of
Justinian that “omnis definitio in jure periculosa,” 26 the drafters of the
French Code Civil did their best with the difficult task of avoiding the
inclusion of too many definitions. In the words of Portalis, “[T]he general
definitions for the most part include only vague and abstract expressions,
whose meaning is often more difficult to determine than the meaning of
the thing itself that is defined. . . . All that is definition, teaching, doctrine,
belongs to the domain of science.” 27 Definitions must, for their purpose
22. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48
LA. L. REV. 1073, 1087–88 (1988).
23. See infra Section I.C.
24. Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Preliminary discourse on the projet of Civil
Code (1800) (trans. M. Shael Herman), in Levasseur, Code Napoleon, supra note
21, at 773.
25. Id. at 769.
26. DIG. 50.17.202 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18). “The Roman lawyers were not
fond of tying themselves down to abstract definitions.” REINHARD ZIMMERMAN,
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
666 (Clarendon Press 1990).
27. Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code, supra note 20, at 698
(translating FENET, supra note 20, at 42). For example, the word “custody” in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2317 or in article 131 is nowhere defined, yet it is
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and essence, be descriptive and exclusive 28 so as to restrict and confine as
much as possible the interpretative power of a court, the latter being
placed, in a sense, in a straitjacket. 29 When codifying, the civil law
legislator is aware that “positive laws can never entirely replace the use of
natural reason in the affairs of life” and that a
host of things is thus necessarily left to the province of custom,
the discussion of learned men and the decisions of judges. The
role of legislation is to set, by taking a broad approach, the general
propositions of the law, to establish principles which will be fertile
in application, and not to get down to the details of questions
which may arise in particular instances. It is for the judge and the
jurist, imbued with the general spirit of the laws, to direct their
application. 30
The blunt, cold, impersonal Romanistic civil law style of drafting
requires, for its application and interpretation, the necessary and
indispensable contribution that judges and jurists bring to the adaptability
and pliability of a civil code. Codified law’s
only purpose [is] to lay down the basic principles of law from
which practical applications can then logically be derived. Being
abstract and general, it is able to include all cases within its scope
without explicitly solving each one, thus leaving sufficient room
for a large amount of judicial creativity. 31

very commonly used and has been given a more and more extensive meaning over
time, such as physical, intellectual, legal, etc.
28. The following definitions are examples from UCC I:
(2) “Aggrieved party” means a party entitled to pursue a remedy
(11) “Consumer” means an individual who enters into a transaction
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(20) “Good faith,” except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing.
U.C.C. § 1-201 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 1977).
29. For an example of a narrow definition, see “lesion” in LA. CIV. CODE art.
2589 (2021).
30. Portalis, supra note 24, at 769.
31. LAW REFORM COMM’N OF CAN., TOWARDS A CODIFICATION OF
CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW § 1.49 (1976).
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C. Role of the Courts and Jurists
In a codified system of law, like Louisiana’s, it is most important for
judges and jurists to remember that it is up to them, “imbued with the
general spirit of the laws, to direct their application.”32 In the words of
Portalis:
There is a science for lawmakers, as there is for judges. . . . The
legislator’s science consists in finding in each subject the
principles most favorable to the common good; the judge’s
science is to put these principles into effect, to diversify them, and
to extend them, by means of wise and reasoned application, to
private causes. . . . 33
In the words of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,
The Code should contain guiding principles for both judges and
lawyers. . . . It should reflect the positive law in a series of clear,
simple rules deliberately shorn of countless details. . . .
[C]odification must not be considered as a vote of non-confidence
in the courts or as something that will suppress their creativity to
the point of reducing them to “judging machines.” . . . As
paradoxical as it may seem, in practice a code leaves judges more
freedom and discretion than they have under the binding authority
of precedent. 34
One can assert that the Romanistic civil law style of drafting
legislation in the form of codes is meant to bring judges “alongside of the
temple of enacted laws and under the legislator’s supervision” in such a
way that a “repository of maxims, decisions and doctrinal writings” is
created, “which steadily grows as all acquired knowledge is added to it,
and which has always been regarded as the true supplement of
legislation.” 35 Portalis’s masterful and unparalleled understanding of the
benefits and purposes of the Romanistic style of drafting legislation found
an echo almost 100 years later in these words from A. Esmein:
[I]t is not a dead legislation which the pages of the Civil Code
contain. It is a living law, which has already lived a long time, and
which, I hope, is called to live a long time yet. . . . The nineteenth
32.
33.
34.
35.

Portalis, supra note 24, at 769.
Portalis, supra note 24, at 772.
LAW REFORM COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 30, at §§ 1.44–45.
Portalis, supra note 24, at 770.
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century saw in the domain of monetary interests, in social
relations, so many new things that the Civil Code did not govern
because it could not foresee them. Certain things that it regulated,
such as movable property, changed almost completely. The
written law had to adapt to the new milieu. Now, these
transformations of the civil law, what noted them down and at the
same time consecrated them? It is case law. Case law is the true
expression of the civil law; it is the real and positive law, as long
as it has not been changed. 36
D. Interpretation: Methods 37
“Interpretation by way of doctrine consists in grasping the true sense
of the laws, applying them in a discerning fashion, and supplementing
them in those cases which the laws have not provided for. Without this
kind of interpretation could we think of fulfilling the judge’s function?” 38
Interpretation in civil law has traditionally been less centric and
more open to arguments based on extrinsic elements such as the
Codifiers’ Report or the writings of legal scholars; there is no
reliance on restrictive principles of interpretation. The strict
interpretation of provisions is limited to provisions of exception,
which in some ways confirms the principle that general law can
be extended to situations not formally envisaged in the text . . . .
Legislative drafting techniques necessarily have an important
influence on interpretation. Clearly, the Code is not drafted in
typical statutory text. A text plainly and concisely setting forth
certain general principles does not easily lend itself to a purely
grammatical method of legislative interpretation. Other methods
(contextual, purposive, historical) tend to be more appropriate. 39
In civil law jurisdictions, all methods of interpretation of statutory law,
such as civil codes, are grounded on two fundamental premises. The first
premise is that statutory law ranks as the primary source of law, as is
36. M.S. Herman & A. Esmein, Excerpts from a Discourse on the Code
Napoleon by Portalis, 18 LOY. L. REV. 23, 28–33 (1971).
37. On Interpretation and Methods, see ALAIN LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A
CIVIL CODE: SOURCES OF LAW AND METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 71–150
(2015) [hereinafter LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE].
38. Portalis, supra note 24, at 771.
39. PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ, THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA
30–32 (4th ed. 2011); see LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE, supra note
36, at 71–150.
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clearly stated in Louisiana Civil Code articles 1 and 2. 40 It follows that the
first and primary responsibility incumbent upon a judge is to identify the
legislation, statutes, or Code articles that is or are the most likely to apply
to the facts of the case under consideration. In this process, the judge will
be called upon to give a proper and single legal characterization to the
facts. 41 The second premise flows logically from the first, and it is that in
some instances, a Louisiana judge will have to “examine the spirit of the
law when the letter kills,” 42 as the judge is directed to do by articles 9 and
10 of the Louisiana Civil Code. 43
Indeed, beyond “the law as written,” 44 “the language of the law,” 45
“the words of a law” 46—in other words, beyond the letter of the law—the
judge must also inquire into the legislative intent or spirit of the law. In the
words of Gény:
We have witnessed the formation of a more delicate and more
flexible method, better harmonized with life, which is a rational
method in the proper sense, not a purely syllogistic method of
reasoning. It is rational because it requests not the fabrication of
syllogisms, but the discovery of solutions which are harmonious
with equity and practical necessities while still being within the
scope of a broad, flexible construction of statutory texts. . . . There
are . . . additional and long recognized methods of interpretation
that provide the interpreter with the means of looking forward, of
projecting the text of a statute or of a code article into the future;
one is encouraged to look “through the Civil Code but beyond the
Civil Code.” 47

40. “The sources of law are legislation and custom.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1
(2021). “Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.” Id. art. 2.
41. See infra Part III.
42. Portalis, supra note 24, at 772.
43. “When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead
to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” LA. CIV.
CODE art. 9 (2021). “When the language of the law is susceptible of different
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the
purpose of the law.” Id. art. 10.
44. Id. art. 9.
45. Id. art. 10.
46. Id. art. 11.
47. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT
PRIVÉ POSITIF LXXVI (Raymond Saleilles trans., 1919). In the Preface to Gény’s
work, Raymond Saleilles wrote:
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The use by civil law judges and jurists of such “extrinsic” methods of
interpretation and reasoning to give life to the written law of code articles
led Roscoe Pound to write:
The civilian is at his best in interpreting, developing, and applying
written texts . . . . In contrast the common-law lawyer is at his
worst when confronted with a legislative text. His technique is one
of developing and applying judicial experience. It is a technique
of finding the grounds of decision in the reported cases. It is a
technique of shaping and reshaping principles drawn from
recorded judicial decisions. Hence while to the civilian the oracles
of the law are academic teachers, the books of authority are codes,
and the text books are commentaries upon codes, to the commonlaw lawyer the oracles are not teachers but judges, the books of
authority are reports of adjudicated cases. 48
For a civil law judge or jurist, “[a]ll our methods of interpretation are
grounded, basically, on the same conception: that law is ‘will,’ ‘human
and reasonable will,’ which enables the interpreter always to find the law
through his own will, since men always find a way to get along.” 49 The
rational and legitimate purpose of using such extrinsic methods of
interpretation is to keep the existing code articles alive by relying upon
techniques or methods of reasoning based on principles of equity, justice,
and reason, 50 which are, by nature, infinite and fertile in application. 51

I could not end with better words than those inspired by an analogous
phrase of Ihering, which is the focal point of the whole book of Mr.
Gény: “Through the Civil Code, but beyond the Civil Code.” Perhaps I
would be among those who should gladly reverse the order of these terms
and say “beyond the Civil Code but through it.”
48. Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law?, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 176, 187
(1937); see also Alain Levasseur, Portalis and Pound: A Debate on
“Codification,” 81 LA. L. REV. 1113 (2021).
49. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 250–51 (22nd ed. 1994); see LEVASSEUR,
DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE, supra note 37, at 105.
50. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2021): “When no rule for a particular situation
can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according
to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.”
51. On Techniques and Methods of Reasoning, see LEVASSEUR,
DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE, supra note 37, at 69–149.
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E. Civil Code Institutions and Concepts
The Romanistic style and its inherent features described above would
be difficult to explain and justify if it were not for the intricate structure of
a civil code, which is tailor-made to allow judges and jurists to fulfill their
role as secondary and persuasive sources of law. 52 The structure of the
Louisiana Civil Code is based on two main pillars. First, legal concepts or
legal institutions, which make up the internal structure of the Code,
contribute to the Code’s cohesiveness through the interdependence that
exists, at different levels, between these institutions. Second, the
intellectual process of legal characterization confines the judge and the
jurist to follow a logical, rational, almost mathematical reasoning of
transposing or translating factual situations into a legal concept or legal
institution, also referred to as a legal category. 53
Because of the material (the Civil Code) and the tools (methods of
reasoning) made available to them, civil law judges should, after making
a few necessary curves along the roads leading to their decisions,
eventually fit, without too many bumps, the factual situations they started
from into the proper legal institution or legal category predesigned and
waiting to provide the legal regime for those factual situations. The
contract of sale, for example, is an institution or legal category that is
identified by a single word. This institution is also a sub-institution within
the larger institution of “contract.” A “third-party beneficiary” is a legal
institution that can be classified as a sub-institution of the broader
institution that is “object” of contracts. A “matrimonial regime” is a subinstitution of “contract,” and the “community of acquêts and gains” is,
itself, a sub-institution of a matrimonial regime.
This short and simple list of some institutions and sub-institutions
illustrates a few of the steps a judge must take in his reasoning. For
example, before focusing on what may appear to be a matrimonial regime
of separation of property and writing an opinion exclusively based on the
sub-institution of a matrimonial regime, the judge should look into the
higher and encompassing institution of contract or conventional obligation
to make sure that the requirements for a valid contract have been met; only
then should the judge look into the specific requirements for the formation
of a matrimonial contract of separation of property. Before siding almost
instinctively with a plaintiff who argues that the thing he bought has a
redhibitory defect and that therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to an
52. On Sources of Law, see LEVASSEUR, DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE, supra
note 37, at 9–42.
53. See infra Part II.
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action in redhibition, a sub-institution of the contract of sale, the judge
should first place the contract of sale into the even broader institution of
contract to determine whether or not the “buyer’s rights are governed by
the general rules of conventional obligations.” 54 In other words, there
could have been an error regarding the “ordinary fitness of the thing” in
the formation of the broader institution of contract that would justify the
nullity of the contract. Since the general legal regime of a contract includes
the lesser institution of the nominate contract, such as a sale, the failure of
a contract to exist carries with it the impossibility of having a contract of
sale.
The above-described interdependence between a general institution
and its sub-institutions is not the only one to exist in the Civil Code. There
exists also a higher interdependence at the level of the institutions
themselves that are spread all throughout the Civil Code. For example,
“Donations inter vivos” 55 are located early in Book 3, Title 2, Chapter 5
under the broader institution “Donations” (Title 2), but because a
“donation inter vivos is a contract,” 56 the even broader institution of
“Conventional Obligations or Contracts” 57 will also control the legal
regime of a “donation inter vivos” as a sub-institution. There is also an
interdependence between “Contractual Capacity and Exceptions”58 as a
sub-institution under “Conventional Obligations or Contracts” and the
broad institution of “Persons” 59 and within that broad institution, with the
sub-institution of “Natural and Juridical Persons.” 60
This interdependence between institutions and sub-institutions was
intentionally created by the drafters of the Civil Code. For that reason, the
Civil Code has been described as a “well ordered monument, whose design
and outlooks have a meaning. Beyond this apparent arrangement, there
exists implicit and changing coordinations, a deep life, hidden feelings and
conceptions which are the true cement of the legal provisions.” 61

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
(1926);
703.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2021).
Id. arts. 1523–1567.
Id. art. 1458.
Id. bk. 3, tit. 4.
Id. bk. 3, tit. 4, ch. 2.
Id. bk. 1.
Id. bk. 1, tit. 1.
J. Ray, ESSAI SUR LA STRUCTURE LOGIQUE DU CODE CIVIL FRANÇAIS
see also Levasseur, On the Structure of a Civil Code, supra note 20, at
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II. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION 62
There is a cause-and-effect relationship between the institutions as
they exist in the Civil Code and the legal characterization and qualification
of the facts as reported by the parties to a case. The intellectual mechanism
that is used to establish an objective and logical relationship between a set
of facts and the institution that best fits them is a reasoning process that
relies on an array of methods of interpretation. 63 It is the main
responsibility and duty of the courts to properly make use of these methods
of interpretation as the necessary tools for deciphering a civil code in the
process of legal characterization 64.
To legally characterize or qualify a set of facts is to essentially move
the facts into their fitting legal category or institution by giving them their
most suitable legal identification or characterization. One can look back at
some courts’ decisions that for some reason, failed to properly assign to
the facts their most logical legal characterization in relying, implicitly and
in a meandering way, on equity at the expense of the law, as in “contracts
have the effect of law for the parties. . . .” 65 Confronted with court
decisions not solidly built on proper legal grounds, doctrine should fulfill
its role as “oracle[] of the law” 66 and step in between the integrity, purity,
and reliability of the law and the necessarily pragmatic and human nature
of the task of judges and lawyers. Errors in legal characterization should
be identified and exposed for the benefit of all since the Code or
“legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will,” 67 whereas cases are
only persuasive sources of law—just as doctrine is—in the Louisiana civil
law system. 68
Like a medical doctor who makes a diagnosis based on a variety of
symptoms presented by a patient, the lawyer or judge can make use of
62. This Part on “legal characterization” is based on the following works:
(1) mainly, JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, Classifications Juridíques et Qualification des
Faits, in METHODOLGIE JURIDIQUE 105–42 (PUF 2018); (2) partially, PHILIPPE
JESTAZ, LE DROIT, DALLOZ 117–18 (Mème éd. 2021).
63. On Methods of Reasoning and Tools of Interpretation, see LEVASSEUR,
DECIPHERING A CIVIL CODE, supra note 37, at 83.
64. Id.
65. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2021); in this respect, see McKee v. Southfield
Sch., 613 So. 2d 659 (La. Ct. App. 2d. Cir. 1993).
66. Pound, supra note 48, at 187.
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2021).
68. See Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm’n, 903 So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005); Phyllis Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So.
2d 119, 128–29 (La. 2000); Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 79
So. 3d 246, 256 (La. 2011).
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several available legal descriptions of institutions in identifying their
particular component parts. In the end, lawyers and judges should come
up with the most appropriate and fitting legal description of the facts by
placing them in one legal category or institution or another. The law—the
Civil Code in particular—provides textbook legal categories, concepts,
and institutions that are framed and articulated around specific rules so that
in order to categorize a certain fact pattern, the judge or lawyer’s task is to
identify those particular rules of law that best fit, like a garment, the
dominant features of the fact pattern under consideration.
After a survey of the different existing legal categories or concepts,
we will look into the raison d’être of the process of legal characterization
and offer our conclusion on this process.
A. Legal Categories
The Dictionary of the Civil Code defines “categorie/category” as
follows:
1. In a group (a classification), distinctive set of elements having
similar characteristics; class, division. Ex. considering things in
general, the categories of movables and immovables; in the
classification of contracts, the categories of synallagmatic
contracts and unilateral contracts; in the professions, the
categories of artisans and merchants.
2. Also designates the fundamental notions which, appearing in
the legal order or in legal thinking as a rational and systematic
arrangement, are defined one relative to the other through a series
of generic and specific characteristics. Ex. . . . juridical acts and
juridical facts, in their respective classifications. 69
The civilian judge or lawyer must, by the intellectual process of legal
characterization, fit any and all sources of obligations under one of the two
most encompassing institutions, which are either “juridical acts” or
“juridical facts.” 70 To do so, the judge or lawyer must first extract and
gather together the essential component parts or features of a factual
situation; then match or fit the selected factual component parts with their
corresponding legal features or characteristics; and finally combine the
identified legal features to select the proper, and hopefully the only,
corresponding legal category. This process is that of “taxonomy” or “the
69. ALAIN LEVASSEUR & M. LAPORTE-LEGEAIS, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL
CODE (2014).
70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2021).
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science of classification; laws and principles covering the classifying of
objects.” 71
In law, classifications facilitate the task of the civil law jurist, judge,
and lawyer in bringing some order and structure to a collection or grouping
of data, elements, and component parts, which are sometimes quite varied.
Classifications, in the context of a Civil Code, are therefore most
instrumental and helpful in knowing, understanding, and explaining the
application of the law to a reality that the law has striven to grasp and
reflect as exactly as possible in its Romanistic style of drafting.
Considering the extreme variety of realities, legal characterizations will
also be varied. Some classifications will be broad and general, others will
be narrow and specific, depending on the extent of the data or elements
that can be gathered together. As a result, a general characterization or
classification will include sub-classifications, and the latter may likely
include sub-sub-classifications. For example, the general legal
classification of “juridical acts” 72 as sources of obligations will include a
sub-classification or category known as “bilateral juridical acts” or
“contracts or conventional obligations,” and this sub-classification will,
itself, include some sub-classifications such as “synallagmatic
contracts,” 73 and within that sub-classification, we will include some
additional sub-classifications such as “sale,” “exchange,” and so forth.
Therefore, setting up a classification begins with a careful examination
of the data that can be grouped together on the basis of their common
features. The definition of categories is but the creation of a process of
reasoning by way of induction that begins with the known data. Therefore,
for each category, it is necessary to identify the major features, data, and
characteristics that are common to all the fact situations brought under its
identification, title, or noun, regardless of the fact that there may be some
minor or secondary differences between these situations. In other words,
one must first isolate the features or elements that are common to the
factual situations that fall under each category and second, identify the
features or elements of those categories from which they must be
distinguished. For example, those “immovables”—a broad legal category
to be distinguished from “movables” as the opposite broad category—said
to be “by declaration,” a sub-category described in Louisiana Civil Code
article 467, 74 should be distinguished from another sub-category,
71.
1988).
72.
73.
74.

Taxonomy, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3rd College ed.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2021).
Id. art. 1908.
Id. art. 467:
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“components parts of tracts of land,” 75 because factually speaking, the first
ones are not “permanently attached to the ground,” being by nature
movables and becoming immovables only by a declaration of the
immovable’s owner.
This process of legal characterization can require going through a
whole series of characterizations or classifications. Let us take “Things”
as an example. 76 A thing can be classified as a movable thing or the
opposite, as an immovable thing; both of these classifications can be subcategorized or sub-classified as corporeal or incorporeal; 77 a corporeal
movable thing can be further sub-categorized or sub-classified as being
governed by the legal regime of community of acquêts and gains 78 and
being further sub-classified as falling in a sub-category of movables assets
of a community enterprise. 79 Each of these categorizations is attached to a
legal regime, but each legal regime is a derivative of a broader, classified
legal regime that is, itself, a sub-classification of an even broader legal
regime. If this legal process of linking one classification to another and to
another is interrupted by the intrusion of a “foreign” classification, one
should go back up the chain of the process to identify the broken link and
reconsider what has apparently been a defective legal analysis.
It is in such a case of conflict between characterizations that the
process of legal characterization proves to be not only helpful but
indispensable to the proper administration of the law of the Civil Code.
One may wonder, however, if this process of legal characterization, being
as logical, almost mathematical, as it is, is not too rigid or inflexible so as
to leave insufficient room for judicial creativity, so as to curtail the judge’s
discretion in his attempt to be responsive to changing social reality? Rigor
of reasoning, of legal analysis, does not mean and cannot mean rigidity or
impermeability of the legal process. As Portalis wrote:
[H]ow can one fetter the movement of time? . . . How can one
know and calculate in advance what only experience can reveal?
Immovables by declaration. The owner of an immovable may declare
that machinery, appliances, and equipment owned by him and placed on
the immovable, other than his private residence, for its service and
improvement are deemed to be its component parts. The declaration shall
be filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable is located.
75. Id. art. 463.
76. Id. bk. 2: Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership.
77. Id. art. 461.
78. Id. art. 2334.
79. Id. art. 2350.
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Can a forecast even encompass matters that thought cannot reach?
A code, however complete it may seem, is hardly finished before
a thousand unexpected issues come to face the judge. For laws,
once drafted, remain as they were written. Men, on the contrary,
are never at rest; they are constantly active, and their unceasing
activities, the effects of which are modified in many ways by
circumstances, produce at each instant some new combination,
some new fact, some new result. A host of things is thus
necessarily left to the province of custom, the discussion of
learned men, and the decision of judges. 80
The learned men and the judges are called to step in to expand, modify,
or create definitions and, “imbued with the general spirit of the laws,” to
resort to methods of reasoning “to direct [the] application” of the laws.81
So jurists, lawyers, and judges are given the means to make the Civil Code
absorb new relationships or things into the civil law system and to fit them
as closely as possible into the existing categories and institutions,
sometimes by adapting them, by correcting them, or by expanding them—
by making them a little more elastic. Relying on Louisiana Civil Code
article 4, judges can instill some flexibility, security, and predictability into
the law. 82 The civil law system is in a position to provide, next to precise
and specific rules, some flexible concepts and categories capable of
incorporating the inevitable changes and creations of the “movement of
time,” capable of incorporating and of confronting the impossibility to
“forecast [and] encompass matters that thought cannot reach.” 83 “[T]he
judge’s science is to put [the] principles [laid down by the lawmakers] into
effect, to diversify them, and to extend them, by means of wise and
reasoned application, to private causes; to examine closely the spirit of the
law when the letter kills.” 84
Some legal concepts or categories have been intentionally left vague
and undetermined to allow their adaptation to unprovided-for legal
situations. “Good faith,” “Unjust enrichment,” “Public order,” “Good
morals,” “Equity,” “Fault,” and “Custody” 85 are all concepts that have
been “juridicalized” to remain fluid and malleable enough for the courts
80. Portalis, supra note 24, at 769.
81. Id.
82. See Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978); LA. CIV. CODE
art. 21 (1870).
83. Portalis, supra note 24, at 769.
84. Id. at 772; see also Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304; W&T Offshore, LLC v.
Texas Brine Corp., 319 So. 3d 822, 823–37 (La. 2019) (Weimer, J., dissenting).
85. See In re C.B., Applying for Adoption, 643 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1994).
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to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. When so doing, the courts are to
focus on and identify the essential features or characteristics of the facts
they are presented with; they must then translate these features or
characteristics into “legal features” that will lead the courts to logically
and methodically aim for the legal concept, institution, or category most
fitting and appropriate to govern the facts under consideration.
For example, the rigidly formulated legal principle according to which
“[c]ontracts have the effect of law for the parties”86 can be softened or
attenuated in its application by bringing in the principle and legal concept
of “good faith,” not only in the performance of the obligation created by
the contract but also, and more importantly, in the very creation of
contractual obligations as is stated, in the imperative form, in Louisiana
Civil Code article 1759. 87 Likewise, the contractual principles of
“autonomy of the will” and “freedom of contract” 88 manifested and
exercised through offer and acceptance 89 can be, and must be, softened
and adapted whenever the principle laid down in article 7 should find room
for application. 90 It is, therefore, the context, the surrounding
circumstances that will provide the judge with necessary elements and data
to enable him to identify the existence, or not, of the proper combination
of legal norms leading to the appropriate legal institution or category.
In the process, a Louisiana judge will find in Louisiana Civil Code
article 4 some sources of guidance in justice, reason, and equity upon
which to rely when coming up with a creative understanding of a fluid
concept suitable for the factual context of the case under consideration.91
In so doing, the judge will be demonstrating his awareness that the Code
could not have meant to “fetter the movement of time,” could not have
calculated “in advance what only experience can reveal,” 92 and that it is
up to him, in relying on “the discussion of learned men,” 93 to issue a
properly fitting decision. A judge, indeed, does not have free rein when
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2021).
87. Id. art. 1759; see “Good Faith” in ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL: A TREATISE 33 (2020); see also id. at 99 (the section
on “Comparative Law of Contracts”).
88. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS:
A PRECIS 14 (2015).
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927 (2021).
90. “Persons may not by their juridical acts derogate from laws enacted for
the protection of the public interest. Any act in derogation of such laws is an
absolute nullity.” Id. art. 7.
91. Id. art 4.
92. Portalis, supra note 24, at 769.
93. Id.

1128

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

calling upon fluid concepts. “It is very fortunate that the judge[] need[s] to
learn, to do research and closely to examine the question presented to him
never permits him to forget that, while there are things within his
discretion, there are none which are entirely up to his caprice or whim.” 94
Thus, over time, these fluid, flexible legal concepts and institutions may
lose some of their flexibility for the benefit of security and stability of the
law. And yet, because of their very nature, they remain flexible and
susceptible to evolving because it is “the judge’s science to put these
principles [most favorable to the common good] into effect, to diversify
them, and to extend them by means of wise and reasoned application to
private causes.” 95
B. Raison D’être of Legal Characterization
The raison d’être, or purpose, of legal characterization is to frame and
formulate the legal regime of an identified legal concept or category that
is the best fitting for a certain set of facts. If a “thing,” a legal concept or
legal category, can be characterized as, first, a movable (a sub-category)
and second, as a corporeal movable, then the overall legal regime
governing, for example, the modalities of delivery of corporeal movables 96
will present itself as a sort of “menu” or panoply from which one will
choose the most appropriate and suitable form of delivery that the facts
would require.
It is very common for a set of facts to command that the process of
legal characterization be undertaken against the background of several
possible legal categories at the same time. If a set of facts is characterized,
first, strongly suggesting that a “civil obligation” does exist, as contrasted
with the legal category of “natural obligations,” that civil obligation will
have to be further characterized as, for example, a “conventional
obligation,” a sub-category that could be contrasted with the sub-category
of “delictual obligations.” The sub-category of conventional obligation or
contract includes some sub-categories such as “bilateral or synallagmatic
contracts” 97 as contrasted with “unilateral contracts,” 98 etc. In a factual
situation, the legal characterization of a “person,” a legal category to be
contrasted with the legal category of “things,” for example, will lead to
94. Id. at 771.
95. Id. at 772.
96. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2477 (2021). Although listed under “Sale,” the
different methods of delivery are themselves a sub-category within the broad legal
category of “obligations to give.”
97. Id. art. 1908.
98. Id. art. 1907.
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that person falling in the sub-category of “natural persons” or in the subcategory of “juridical persons”; 99 as a natural person, that person could be
sub-categorized as “a capable person,” as opposed to an “incapable
person,” and as a capable person, she could be sub-characterized as a
“married person” in the broad category of “Marriage” and as having
entered into the sub-category of “the community of acquêts and gains” as
opposed to the sub-category of “separation of property.” 100 Each legal
characterization into a legal class or category will have an impact on
another legal category so that, for example, following a process of
elimination, the “person” concerned will eventually be classified in a
certain legal category made up of compatible component parts or features
from a few or several sub-legal categories. Through a process that can be
varyingly extensive and intricate, a broad or general legal category or
classification can be made up of legal features borrowed from a list, long
or short, of legal regimes that belong to legal sub-categories. In other
words, to start and stop one’s legal analysis with classifying a person as
“married under the community regime” is contrary to the structure and
spirit of the Civil Code, which requires that one reason from the particular
to the general, from the “matrimonial regime of community” to the validity
of the “marriage” to the validity of the “civil contract” of marriage. One
must, in a sense, establish a checklist to make sure that the legal regime of
each step in the process of characterization is controlling and not defective.
To take another example, if the facts before a court appear to point to
a contract of sale because it looks like there is potentially an issue of
redhibition raised by the plaintiff, the court should, before focusing on the
presumed existence of a sale, make sure that the requirements for a valid
contract, as a broad and general category, have been met. Indeed, there
may not have been a contract at all to start with, because there may have
been an error as to the object or as to the cause of the contract, and hence
a vice of consent in the formation of the general or generic contract. If no
contract can exist, no sale, a fortiori, can exist, and therefore no legal
regime of a sale that could have presented an issue of redhibition. 101
C. Legal Characterizations: Concluding Remarks
The process of legal characterization is dictated by the Romanistic
style of a Code, the intentional lack of definitions, the most important and
indispensable methods of interpretation, as well as the intentional and
99. Id. art. 24.
100. Id. arts. 2334–2369.8, 2370–2376.
101. See id. arts. 2477, 2524, 2529.
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necessary cooperation between the primary sources of law (legislation and
custom) and the secondary or persuasive sources (jurisprudence and
doctrine). Is it not illustrative of the importance of this process of legal
characterization that the laws themselves are subjected to this process,
which leads to a distinction between “imperative” and “suppletive” law as
well as between “substantive” and “interpretative-remedial” laws? 102
One first objective of this process of characterization is to demonstrate
that many legal categories are legally compatible with one another because
they are intertwined and create a coherent and rational web of cumulative
relationships that is an inherent and characteristic part of the concept of
codification. A second objective has been to show, conversely, that some
categories or institutions are mutually exclusive and conflicting and
cannot therefore lead to a good, logical, and well-grounded decision. 103
One benefit to be derived from an incompatible characterization of
categories or institutions is that it helps one to reason “with the Code and
through the Code,” to reason inductively as well as deductively in order to
find the “straight” line of one’s reasoning. A second benefit is to ensure
that the legal regimes of the cumulative characterizations into categories
are compatible, well intertwined, so as to lead to a coherent, logical, and
“strictly legal” decision.
The existence of concurring and dissenting opinions suggest that at a
certain stage in the reasoning process of legal characterization, judges have
followed different paths in their own legal analysis and have come up with
different legal characterizations. Yet there can be only one legal solution,
one decision in a case, and therefore one legal characterization must
prevail. If that legal characterization is strong enough, if it is well
grounded, it may be the first opinion that will turn into a jurisprudence
constante and last for a few years until another well-grounded opinion,
perhaps inspired by doctrinal writings, will signal a reversal of an
established line of decisions and become the first stone on which a new
jurisprudence constante may be built. 104 Such is the balance between the
“science of the lawmaker and the judge’s science” in a codified system of
law where “the legislator must pay attention to case law” . . . and where
“one cannot dispense with case law any more than he can dispense with
legislation.” 105
102. See Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723 (La. 1994).
103. See McKee v. Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1993); Alain Levasseur, Private Law: Sales, 38 LA. L. REV. 367 (1978); infra Part
III.
104. See Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974); State v. Cuchinelli,
261 So. 2d 217 (La. 1972).
105. Levasseur, Code Napoleon, supra note 21, at 772.
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III. ILLUSTRATIONS
The following are illustrations of our own process of legal
characterization as applied, first, to a Code article and, second, to a few
cases.
A. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2007
Article 2007 states, “An obligee may demand either the stipulated
damages or performance of the principal obligation, but he may not
demand both unless the damages have been stipulated for mere delay.” 106
We believe, as we will explain below, that this article is a good
illustration of an inconsistent and incoherent series of legal
characterizations and for that reason, should be rewritten.
Where Does the Process of Legal Characterization Applied to Art. 2007
Lead Us?
1: The first and primary legal characterization is that of “Obligations
in General and General Principles.” 107 Of particular relevance is article
1756, specifically the word “performance”: “An obligation is a legal
relationship whereby a person, called the obligor, is bound to render a
performance in favor of another, called the obligee. Performance may
consist of giving, doing or not doing something.” 108
2: Also of prime relevance is article 1758(A), entitled “General
effects”:
A. An obligation may give the obligee the right to:
(1) Enforce the performance that the obligor is bound to render;
(2) Enforce the performance by causing it to be rendered by
another at the obligor’s expense;
(3) Recover damages for the obligor’s failure to perform, or his
defective or delayed performance. 109
One should notice that under (A)(3), damages can be recovered “for the
obligor’s failure to perform.” 110 In other words, an obligee has the right,
per article 1758(A)(1), to “[e]nforce the performance that the obligor is
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

LA. CIV. CODE art. 2007 (2021).
Id. bk. III, tit. III, ch. 1.
Id. art. 1756.
Id. art. 1758(A).
Id.
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bound to render.” 111 Performance of his obligation by the obligor is his
“primary” obligation—the performance he agreed to carry out in the
contract—and the obligee may enforce that performance.
3: A sub-characterization within the general legal characterization of
Obligations in General is that of the Extinction of Obligations in Chapter
6 of the same Title 3. 112 Within this sub-characterization we find a series
of sub-sub-characterizations describing the different modes of extinction
of obligations. Among them we find Performance in Section 1 of this
Chapter 6. 113 Article 1854 in Section 1 Performance states: “Performance
by the obligor extinguishes the obligation.” 114 Article 1855 adds that
“[p]erformance may be rendered by a third person, even against the will
of the obligee, unless the obligor or the obligee has an interest in
performance only by the obligor. Performance rendered by a third person
effects subrogation only when so provided by law or by agreement.” 115
Nowhere in articles 1854 to 1863, under the characterization of
Performance, is the word “damages” mentioned!
4: Obligations in General, as a general legal characterization, includes
some sub-characterizations based on the source of an obligation. In this
broad characterization of Obligations in General we find a subcharacterization under the title of Extinction of Obligations, which itself
includes six sub-classifications, from Performance to Confusion. 116 The
sub-characterization of Performance within the very general
characterization of Obligations in General is applicable to all obligations
regardless of their sources. Among those sources is the subcharacterization of Conventional Obligations or Contracts. 117 Another
sub-classification of sources of Obligations is that of Obligations Arising
Without Agreement, which itself includes sub-characterizations such as
Management of Affairs and of Offenses and Quasi-Offenses. 118
Reverting back to the sub-characterization of Contracts: contracts is,
itself, further sub-characterized or classified. Among the subcharacterizations of contracts, we can mention Formation of Contracts, an
extensive characterization that encompasses several sub-characterizations
such as Capacity, Consent, Vices of Consent, etc. 119 Under Contracts, we
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. bk. III, tit. III, ch. 6.
Id. bk. III, tit. III, ch. 6, sec. 1.
Id. art. 1854.
Id. art. 1855.
Id. bk. III, tit. III, ch. 6.
Id. bk. III, tit. IV.
Id. bk. III, tit. V.
Id. bk. III, tit. IV, chs. 2–4.
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also find another sub-characterization that bears the title of Effects of
Conventional Obligations. 120 This latter characterization is of importance
here in our analysis of Louisiana Civil Code article 2007.
5: Within the characterization of Effects of Conventional Obligations,
which is itself under Contracts, we find two relevant sub-characterizations
with the titles of Damages 121 and Stipulated Damages. 122 These two
characterizations of Damages and Stipulated Damages should not only be
analyzed within the broader characterization of Effects of Conventional
Obligations but also within the very general characterization of
Obligations in General, since a conventional obligation is but a kind of
obligation in general identified as “conventional” because of its source.
Within that broad characterization of Obligations in General, the
characterizations of Damages and Stipulated Damages will necessarily be
read in connection with Performance as a form of Extinction of
Obligations. Indeed, under the all-encompassing characterization of
Obligations in General, Louisiana Civil Code article 1758 makes it very
clear that in the first place, “[a]n obligation may give the obligee the right
to: (1) Enforce the performance that the obligor is bound to render” and
that in second place, “[a]n obligation may give an obligee the right to . . .
(3) Recover damages for the obligor’s failure to perform. . . .” 123
6: One conclusion from the discussion above is obvious and
inescapable: Performance by an obligor of his obligation is primary and
vests in the obligee the right to demand that his obligor perform his
obligation, which is “a duty correlative and incidental to a . . . right.” 124
Performance “may be enforced . . . against a successor of the obligor”
when the nature of the obligation so allows 125 or only against the obligor
when the “obligation is strictly personal . . . [and] can be enforced only
against the obligor.” 126 In addition, Performance and its derivative
Specific Performance are component sub-characterizations of Effects of
120. Id. bk. III, tit. IV, ch. 8.
121. Id. bk. III, tit. IV, ch. 8, sec. 4.
122. Id. bk. III, tit. IV, ch. 8, sec. 5.
123. Id. art. 1758.
124. Id. art. 1763.
125. Id. art. 1765:
An obligation is heritable when its performance may be enforced by a
successor of the obligee or against a successor of the obligor.
Every obligation is deemed heritable as to all parties, except when the
contrary results from the terms or from the nature of the contract.
A heritable obligation is also transferable between living persons.
126. “An obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced
only by the obligee, or only against the obligor.” Id. art. 1766.
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Conventional Obligations and fall under the control of article 1983, which
stipulates that “Contracts have the effect of law . . . . [and] must be
performed in good faith.” 127
7: A second conclusion is that the payment of damages is a secondary
obligation on the part of the obligor in the sense that it is derived from the
failure of the obligor to carry out his primary obligation to perform. Once
again, this is an obvious and inescapable conclusion that can be easily
drawn from Louisiana Civil Code article 1994, which provides, “An
obligor is liable for the damages caused by his failure to perform a
conventional obligation. A failure to perform results from
nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance.” 128 In
other words, the payment of damages is a sort of coercive measure that is
hanging over an obligor’s head and given to the courts to administer when
an obligor fails to perform his primary obligation or when his performance
is defective or late. 129 Regarding stipulated damages, the conclusion is the
same as the conclusion of damages. Art. 2005 is clear when it states,
“Parties may stipulate the damages to be recovered in the case of
nonperformance, defective performance, or delay in performance of an
obligation. That stipulation gives rise to a secondary obligation for the
purpose of enforcing the principal one.” 130 The second paragraph of article
2005 could not be more explicit when it classifies the stipulated damages
as “a secondary obligation,” which has the “purpose of enforcing the
principal one.” 131
Damages, in general or as stipulated in a contract, are not, therefore, a
substitute for the performance of the primary or principal obligation; they
are not the equivalent of the principal obligation; they are not on the same
level as the primary obligation. They are only a secondary obligation,
considered as a means of preventing an obligee who acted in good faith
from suffering a loss he has sustained or may sustain and from being
deprived of the profit he was entitled to make.
8: Our verdict on Louisiana Civil Code article 2007: According to this
article, “an obligee may demand either the stipulated damages or
performance. . . .” 132 This sentence is legally wrong in its wording and
likely, in its intent or reason. To place the demand for stipulated damages
at the beginning of the sentence is an obvious disregard of the law of
Obligations in General, (see paragraphs 2, 3, and 6, above) in which
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. art. 1983.
Id. art. 1994.
Id.
Id. art. 2005.
Id.
Id. art. 2007
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performance is the principal or primary obligation of an obligor.
“Performance” and “failure to perform” should open the sentence!
Secondly, to consider stipulated damages as co-equal to performance is,
again, a mischaracterization, an illegal characterization of both these
institutions or concepts. Performance is a primary or principal obligation
whereas stipulated damages—as being “damages” first and “stipulated”
second, because of the wills of the parties to a contract—are a secondary
obligation in the words of article 2005 133 and by their own nature. Thirdly,
when placing stipulated damages and performance on the same level
through the use of the conjunctions “either” and “or,” article 2007 can be
characterized as having created an “alternative obligation” under the
words of Louisiana Civil Code article 1808. 134 Indeed, in an alternative
obligation, both obligations are considered to be of the same relevance and
importance to the parties, obligee and obligor. Both obligations are
primary obligations. Therefore, if, as per the letter and substance of article
2007, 135 one obligation is labeled “stipulated damages,” it cannot be an
alternative to the other obligation because, per article 2005, stipulated
damages are meant to be “recovered in case of nonperformance, defective
performance, or delay in performance of an obligation.” 136 It is therefore
nonsense for an obligation to be both itself and its own recovery at the
same time!
Furthermore, if the parties to the contract have not stipulated
otherwise, “[w]hen an obligation is alternative, the choice of the item of
performance belongs to the obligor unless it has been expressly or
impliedly granted to the obligee.” 137 In other words: “Obligee beware!!”
Louisiana Civil Code article 2007 must be rewritten to reflect the
proper and logical coherence in the ranking and mingling of all the
relevant characterizations or classifications of the many institutions and
concepts involved in the background of this article. Damages are not the
co-equal of performance; they are not an alternative obligation. The
obligor does not have a choice between damages and performance. Is it
not obvious and very meaningful that damages are not listed among the
modes of Extinction of Obligations, a broad characterization under an even
broader characterization of Obligations in General? Damages are listed
under Effects of Conventional Obligations—therefore, not as mode of
extinction of obligations—and as such, as resulting from “an obligor
133. Id. art. 2005.
134. “An obligation is alternative when an obligor is bound to render only one
of two or more items of performance.” Id. art. 1808.
135. Id. art. 2007.
136. Id. art. 2005.
137. Id. art. 1809.
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[being] liable for the damages caused by his failure to perform a
conventional obligation.” 138 As a consequence of this obligor’s failure to
perform his obligation, damages are owed. Therefore, it is a total
misunderstanding to put performance and damages on the same level. In
addition, damages are measured only by the loss sustained by the obligee
and the profit of which he has been deprived. “Loss and profit deprived
of” are not the co-equal of the primary performance, and that is the reason
why damages are called “damages,” i.e., meant to “repair the damage
caused” by the breach of the primary obligation.
B. A Court of Appeal Decision, McKee v. Southfield School 139
1. Brief Summary of the Facts for Purposes of Our Analysis
The Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit stated that
McKee IV was not a party to the contracts between his father, McKee III,
and the Southfield School that was to provide an education to the then
minor, McKee IV. 140 The court stated also that McKee IV, while not a
party to the contracts, was an interested beneficiary of the contracts and
was, therefore, entitled to a direct action against Southfield School under
Louisiana Civil Code article 1978. 141 The court went on to add, however,
that “McKee [IV] is in no better position than would be his father to
demand that Southfield further perform under the contract” (citing art.
1982), in issuing a transcript of his son’s education, because his father,
McKee III, had failed to pay to the school the full amount of the tuition he
owed for the education of his son. 142
McKee IV, now a person of age in his action against the school, asked
the court to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the school to deliver
to him, an official transcript of his academic record. Despite ruling that
“McKee [IV] (son) is in no better position than would be his father to
demand that Southfield further perform under the contract,” 143 the court of
appeal went on, surprisingly enough, to state that “Although McKee
cannot demand performance under the contract, he may do so on the basis
of detrimental reliance.” 144

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. art. 1994.
McKee v. Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 662 (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 1982 (1993)).
Id.
Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967 (1993)).
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The facts as summarized are directing us to divide them into two sets
of sub-facts and therefore, to analyze each one of these sub-sets under its
proper legal characterization. Since three persons were involved in the
case, we have to start, first, with the legal characterization of the legal
status of each of these persons under Book I of the Civil Code, Persons. 145
This first major legal characterization will have an impact on the second
major legal characterization of the relationships between these persons
involved. These relationships will be determined by the legal sources of
the obligations that may have been created in the makeup of these
relationships.
2. First Legal Characterization: Persons
Since three persons were involved in this case, actively or passively,
a legal characterization of the legal status of each one of them must open
our legal analysis to determine, in the second legal characterization, the
role played by each person in their “triangular” relationships.
The very first and most encompassing legal characterization made in
the Civil Code is introduced in article 24: “There are two kinds of persons:
natural persons and juridical persons.” 146 Transposing the facts of the case
into this dual legal characterization, the Southfield School would be a
juridical person, while McKee III and McKee IV would be natural persons.
Nothing more needs to be said about the school.
Focusing on the father and son duo, a logical sub-characterization
arises under the title Parent and Child (Title 7, Book I). 147 Moving another
step down in our legal analysis, we are given two intertwined sub-subcharacterizations of this Parent and Child characterization under the titles
of General Principles of Parental Authority and Obligations of Parents.
In the legal regime of General Principles of Parental Authority, we find
article 222, which states: “Parental authority includes representation of the
child and the right to designate a tutor for the child.” 148 Article 223 adds
that “[p]arental authority includes rights and obligations of physical care,
supervision, protection, discipline, and instruction of the child.” 149 In its
wording, article 223 leads to Obligations of Parents as a related subcharacterization. In this sub-characterization, we can read in article 224
that “[p]arents are obligated to support, maintain, and educate their child.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

LA. CIV. CODE bk. III, tit. IV (2021).
Id. art. 24.
Id. bk. I, tit, VII.
Id. art. 222.
Id. art. 223.
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The obligation to educate a child continues after minority as provided by
law.” 150
This sequence of legal characterizations leads one to say that McKee
III, as father of McKee IV, had the legal obligation to educate his son and
that McKee IV, as a minor child, had no legal capacity to enter into a
contract with the Southfield School, a juridical person.
Article 222, in its wording, brings on our legal canvass another most
relevant institution or legal characterization mentioned in Book 3 under
the title Representation, and under the broader title Representation and
Mandate. In the words of article 2985, “A person may represent another
person in legal relations as provided by law or by juridical act. This is
called representation.” 151 If this article was not in the Civil Code when this
case was before the courts, it remains that article 222152 was in the Code
and so was the institution of Mandate, which was then, and still is, a
contractual form of representing someone. Under Code articles 222, 223,
and 224, the father was representing his son, then a minor and therefore
legally incapable, in the contracts with the school. It follows that under the
law, McKee IV was a party to the contracts as represented by his father,
his legal representative under the law. 153
That McKee IV was a party to the contracts with the school is further
established by another institution or legal characterization of Book 3 of the
Civil Code under the name of Confirmation in article 1842. 154 Indeed,
when McKee IV brought an action against the school to demand that he
be issued a transcript, he based his action on the contracts entered into in
his name by his father with the school. 155 In bringing this action, McKee
IV was “confirming” that he had been in a contractual relationship with
Southfield School back at a time when he was legally incapable but
represented by his father. Now of age, McKee IV was “confirming” that
he was “curing” the potential relative nullity of the contracts on the ground
of his former incapacity on account of his age.
So it is our conclusion that the court of appeal should not have stated
that “McKee, while not a party to the contract. . . .” 156 McKee had been a
party to the contract from day one and later, when of age, he confirmed
that he had been a party to the contract from day one.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
1993).
156.

Id. art. 224.
Id. art. 2985.
Id. art. 222.
Id. arts. 222–224.
Id. art. 1842.
McKee v. Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659, 661 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
Id. at 659.
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3. Relationships Between the Parties: Legal Characterizations
1: Legal characterization of the contract. Of the four requirements
for the formation of a valid contract, the requirements of cause and object
are the most instrumental in the legal characterization of the contract in
this case. Regarding the cause of the contract, it appears that it consisted
in the father’s “duty and reason” of giving an education to his son, and it
was so understood by the school. Regarding the object of the contract,
because it is a synallagmatic and onerous contract, 157 there are obligations
on both sides of the contract, and therefore, each obligation has an object
or maybe two objects. 158 One of these multiple objects will be singled out
and contribute to the legal characterization of the contract.
On the father’s side, the object of his obligation was to pay the tuition.
Such would be an obligation on the part of the father “to give,” to deliver
a certain amount of money to the school. As such, this object of the father’s
obligation does not help much in the legal characterization of the contract
since one may owe money to another for a variety of reasons or causes.
On the school’s side, the main object of its obligation, and the object
that the father was considering as the reason for his entering into a contract
with the school, was the education he wanted his son to receive. As an
object, education is an incorporeal thing and the object of an obligation “to
do,” to wit, provide a service. 159 Hence the legal characterization of the
contract as being “hiring of industry,” 160 a special kind of “Lease.” 161
Under normal circumstances, had the father paid the full amount of the
tuition in due time, the school would have acknowledged having provided
his son an education and having received the full tuition by issuing the
father and son a transcript. Since the issuance of a transcript is the ground
for McKee IV’s action against Southfield School, the question is whether
there was an obligation on the part of the school to issue a transcript
regardless of whether the father had paid the whole tuition. Was the school
bound by the contract to issue a transcript as a separate and distinct object
from the education as the principal object of the contract? Was there a
separate cause for the transcript? One can look at a transcript as a receipt
for the length of an education provided for a certain amount of tuition paid
on time. An education for the tuition would be the objects of the correlative
obligations of the parties, and their performance “in good faith” an effect
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1908–1909 (2021).
Id. arts. 1971–1972.
Id. arts. 1756, 1765, 1766.
Id. arts. 2745.
Id. arts. 2668.
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of the contract as the law for the parties.162 In not handing over a transcript,
Southfield School was exercising its right not to consent to a unilateral
modification of the contract by the father, who was relying on his partial
performance of his obligation to pay the tuition and was unwilling to pay
the disputed part of the amount of tuition he owed. 163 One can also look
upon the father’s payments in installments, consented to by the school, as
suspensive terms. Under article 1990, the mere arrival of the term puts the
obligor in default—the father thus being in default every time he failed to
pay the requested amount of tuition. 164 Such a breach of his obligations by
the father cannot be used as a ground for bringing an action to compel the
obligee, Southfield School, to perform its own obligation.
It is obvious that Southfield School could not “take back” the
education it had provided the son so as to enable the school to “erase the
past” in issuing a “blank” transcript to the son. The transcript is, in a sense,
a corporeal thing that represents an incorporeal thing, the education—or
in legal terms, an accessory thing, which could not exist but for the
existence of a principal thing. In application of the principle accessorium
sequitur principale (the accessory follows the principal), since the father
failed to pay the tuition for the education received by his son, the father
was not entitled to receive the accessory thing of the principal thing.
2: Detrimental Reliance. Detrimental reliance, if considered as
“cause” under Code article 1967, 165 would then become a required element
for the formation of a contract, as are consent, object, and capacity. If the
cause of a contract is unlawful or contrary to public policy, the contract
cannot exist because of its nullity. 166 When cause exists at the time of the
formation of a contract, it must also be in existence for as long as the
contract is binding between the parties. In the McKee case, there was a
valid contract, binding between the parties, including the son McKee IV,
and the cause of the synallagmatic, onerous contract was lawful.
There is absolutely no reasonable legal argument that could be made
in support of detrimental reliance as cause 167 to be used by a party to the
contract as some kind of a ground of action of an “equitable nature” to
undo the fundamental principle expressly stated in article 2983 that
“[c]ontracts have the effects of law for the parties and may be dissolved
only through the consent of the parties or on grounds provided by
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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law. . . .” 168 And it is particularly so when the party-plaintiff is an obligor
who failed to perform his obligation. As Judge Victory wrote so well in
his dissent: “[T]he majority has erroneously applied the doctrine of
detrimental reliance to force the non-breaching party, Southfield, to fully
perform under the contract after repeated breaches of the contract by
plaintiff’s father, in whose shoes he stands under the contract.” 169
3: Third Party Beneficiary. Surreptitiously and not overtly, the
majority hinted at the possible existence of the institution of a third party
beneficiary in the person of the son, McKee IV, when the court referred to
the 1979 case of National Safe Corp. v. Benedict and Myrick, Inc. and in
a long paragraph that follows. 170 Judge Victory put words under the
majority’s pen when he wrote: “Assuming, arguendo, that detrimental
reliance can be applicable to a situation where the third party beneficiary
is the child of the party breaching a contract. . . .” 171 Beside the fact, as
explained above, that the son was actually and legally a party to the
contract and therefore could not hide behind being a third party
beneficiary, the legal regime of this institution would be an obstacle he
could not surmount. Indeed, under Louisiana Civil Code article 1982,
“[t]he promisor may raise against the beneficiary such defenses based on
the contract as he may have raised against the stipulator.” 172 Thus, even if
McKee IV could be considered a third party beneficiary, he could not have
greater rights than his father (stipulator) had to go against the school
(promisor)—and the father had no rights.
4: Conclusion. For the reasons given above, the majority was wrong
in affirming the trial court judgment that required Southfield School to
issue a transcript to McKee IV. 173
168. Id. art. 1983.
169. McKee v. Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659, 664 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1993).
170. Id. at 661 (citing Nat’l Safe Corp. v. Benedict and Myrick, Inc., 371 So.
2d 792 (La. 1979)).
171. Id. at 663.
172. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1982 (2021).
173. For two additional illustrations of wrong legal characterizations, see
Alain Levasseur, Réméré, Option, Security Contract, or What? Case of Potts v.
Spatafora, in An About Turn, 38 LA. L. REV. 360, 367 (1978); Alain Levasseur,
Sale of a Thing or Letting and Hiring of Industry, 39 LA. L. REV. 705 (1979).
For four very good illustrations of legal characterizations, see Segura v. Frank,
630 So. 2d 714 (La. 1994); W&T Offshore, L.L.C. v. Tex. Brine Corp., 319 So.
3d 822, 823–37 (La. 2019) (Weimer, J., dissenting); DePhillips v. Hosp. Serv.
Dist. No.1 of Tangipahoa Par., No. 19-01496, 2020 WL 3867212 (La. July 9,
2020); Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm’n, 903 So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005).

